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TAXATION
OVERVIEW
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed over thirty cases in the
area of taxation during the past year. Many of these were tax "protester"
cases that involved specious defenses and as such, will not be reviewed here.
Of the remaining cases, few broke new ground in the field of tax law. Sev-
eral cases did highlight splits among the circuits, showing the need for
Supreme Court review or congressional clarification.
I. ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL SUMMONS
A. Background
The Secretary' is empowered, under section 7602 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code, to examine any books, papers, records,2 or other data necessary to
audit a taxpayer's return, and to summon the taxpayer or any person having
possession of such books, papers, records, or data to appear before the Secre-
tary to give testimony or to produce the documents. This authorization is
limited to the purposes of:
[A]scertaining the correctness of any return, making a return where
none has been made, determining the liability of any person for
any internal revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of any
transferee or fiduciary of any person in respect of any internal reve-
nue tax, or collecting any such liability . . .
Noticeably absent from the list of authorized purposes is that of obtaining
information for a criminal prosecution or investigation. The possible consti-
tutional problems that would be associated with such an authorization are
obvious. Nonetheless, "[t]he legislative history of the Code supports the con-
clusion that Congress intended to design a system with interrelated criminal
and civil elements," '4 and Congress as well as the courts have attempted to
draw the line that separates the permissible from the impermissible use by
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS or Service) of its summons authority.
In those cases in which a summons is issued under the authority of sec-
tion 7602 and directed at a third-party recordkeeper, 5 the taxpayer must be
1. "The term 'Secretary' means the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate." I.R.C.
§ 7701(a)(l )(B) (1976). "The term 'or his delegate' when used with reference to the Secretary
of the Treasury, means any officer, employee, or agency of the Treasury Department duly au-
thorized by the Secretary of the Treasury directly, or indirectly by one or more redelegations of
authority, to perform the function mentioned or described in the context. Id.
§ 7701(a)(12)(A).
2. I.R.C. § 6001 authorizes the Secretary to prescribe rules and regulations requiring
every person liable for tax to keep records, render statements, and make returns. See also 26
C.F.R. §§ 1.6001-1 to 1.6011-1 (1982).
3. I.R.C. § 7602(a) (1976).
4. United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 310 (1978).
5. The definition of a "third-party recordkeeper" is found in I.R.C. § 7609(a)(3) (1976)
(amended 1982).
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given notice of the summons.6 The taxpayer has the right to intervene in
any summons enforcement proceeding, as well as the right to stay compli-
ance with the summons by giving written notice to the person summoned
not to comply with the summons. 7 The growth of the Service's use of these
summonses, and the increasing number of taxpayers refusing to produce re-
quested material or ordering third-party recordkeepers to stay compliance
with such summonses8 have compelled the courts to establish guidelines that
strike a balance between the Service's right to obtain information under sec-
tion 7602 and the taxpayer's individual rights.
One of the early Supreme Court cases in this area was United States v.
Powell,9 in which the Court rejected the taxpayer's contention that the IRS
must show probable cause to suspect fraud before it could seek enforcement
of a summons. The Court held instead that the Service must demonstrate
that there is a legitimate purpose for the investigation, that the inquiry is
relevant to the purpose, that the Commissioner does not already possess the
information, and that he has followed all of the administrative steps required
by the Code.10 The Court then added a general prohibition against issuing
a summons for any purpose that would reflect upon the "good faith" of the
investigation. I I
Later, in Donaldson v. United States, 12 the Court apparently laid down
two separate standards, which resulted in confusion and inconsistency
among the circuit courts. At one point in the opinion the Court ruled that
where the sole purpose of the investigation is to gather evidence for a crimi-
nal prosecution, enforcement may properly be denied.13 The Court's stated
holding, however, was slightly different: "[A section 7602] summons may be
issued in aid of an investigation if it is issued in good faith and prior to a
recommendation for criminal prosecution."'
4
Seven years later, the Court was presented with an opportunity to settle
this confusion. In United States v. La Salle National Bank,' 5 the trial court
found that the motivation of the IRS agent in conducting the investigation
was solely to gather evidence for a criminal prosecution. The taxpayer then
6. I.R.C. § 7609(a)(1), (2) (1976) (amended 1982).
7. Id. § 7609(b). IRS summonses are not self-enforcing; rather, the Service must proceed
under I.R.C. § 7604 to enforce a summons. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 331, 96 Stat. 324, 620-21 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 7609(b)(2)(A)),
also grants the taxpayer the right to commence a proceeding to quash such a summons.
8. Nuzum, LaSalle National Bank and the J'udtical Defenses to the Enforcement ofan Administra-
tive Summons, 32 TAX LAW. 383, 384 (1979).
9. 379 U.S. 48 (1964). See also Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964) (IRS summons
may be challenged on any appropriate ground, including defense that the material is sought for
use in a criminal prosecution).
10. 379 U.S. at 57-58.
11. [A] court may not permit its process to be abused. Such an abuse would take
place if the summons had been issued for an improper purpose, such as to harass the
taxpayer or to put pressure on him to settle a collateral dispute or for any other pur-
pose reflecting on the good faith of the particular investigation.
Id. at 58.
12. 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
13. Id. at 533.
14. Id. at 536.
15. 437 U.S. 298 (1978).
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argued, and the trial court agreed, that he was not required to prove the
absence of a civil purpose for the summons.
The Court rejected this argument and reaffirmed its adoption of the
Powell elements of a good faith exercise of the summons authority.' 6 The
Court summarized the several requirements for enforcement. The summons
must be issued before the Service recommends criminal prosecution to the
Justice Department, and the Service must at all times exercise the summons
authority in good faith.' 7 This second prerequisite, according to the Court,
incorporated the Powell standards of good faith and included the further
requirement that the Service not abandon the pursuit of court tax determi-
nation or collection."8 Whether the Service has abandoned its civil investi-
gation depends upon the institutional posture of the IRS and not the
objective of the individual agent. 19 The Court offered two examples of insti-
tutional bad faith: 1) delay by the Service in recommending a criminal in-
vestigation to the Justice Department once the institutional commitment for
the referral has been made; and 2) action by the Service as an information-
gathering agency for other departments.
20
B. Some Questions Answered, Some Remain Unsettled
Powell, Donaldson, and LaSalle supply the backdrop for three major
Tenth Circuit opinions addressed to IRS summons enforcement proceedings.
In the first of the three cases, United States v. Security Bank and Trust Co. ,21 the
court was called upon to rule on the extent to which discovery by a taxpayer
would be permitted when he or she asserted the defense that the Service was
pursuing a purely criminal investigation into his tax affairs. In Security Bank,
the Service had issued a summons to the bank pursuant to its investigation of
the income tax liability of Virgil Fox. At Fox's request the bank refused to
comply with the summons. The Service petitioned the district court for en-
forcement of the summons, and Fox intervened as authorized by section
7609(b)(1). 22 Prior to the enforcement proceeding, Fox served eighteen in-
terrogatories on the IRS agent who had issued the summons, but the agent
objected to all but one as being irrelevant.2 3 At the enforcement hearing,
Fox filed a motion for an order to compel answers to the interrogatories.
The trial court denied the motion, instead directing Fox to propound the
interrogatories to the agent who was present at the hearing. The agent an-
swered some of the questions but objected to several others, and the court
sustained the objections.24 After the court ordered enforcement of the sum-
mons, Fox appealed the trial court's rulings on the objections.
16. Id. at 313-14.
17. /d. at 318.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 316.
20. Id. at 316-17.
21. 661 F.2d 847 (10th Cir. 1981).
22. I.R.C. § 7609(b)(1) (1976).
23. 661 F.2d at 849.
24. Id. The interrogatories in question read as follows:
9. State whether or not the Internal Revenue Service has ever had [appellant]
under surveillance either by wire or any other means.
1983]
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The court of appeals reasoned that since the Supreme Court in LaSalle
placed the burden of disproving a valid civil purpose for the investigation
upon the party opposing enforcement of the summons25 "the LaSalle Court
must have envisioned at least limited discovery." '2 6 This is necessarily so
because a taxpayer asserting the defense of improper purpose must rely on
information within the knowledge of the Service.2 7 Although most of the
circuits have recognized the taxpayer's right to discovery, the proof required
to obtain discovery, as well as the extent of discovery permitted, varies
among the circuits. The Tenth Circuit has adopted the relatively restrictive
position that discovery is available only in "extraordinary situations. '28
Fox had objected to enforcement solely on the ground that the IRS was
pursuing a purely criminal investigation. The court of appeals, following the
guidelines set down in LaSalle, directed its inquiry to whether the interroga-
tories might yield information suggesting the IRS was not actively engaged
in a civil investigation and found Interrogatories Nine through Twelve whol-
ly irrelevant to this issue. 29 The court also observed that, although part (c)
of Interrogatory Thirteen could be relevant in determining whether the IRS
was investigating possible criminal violations, "even if a criminal investiga-
tion is underway, the Service may use the summons power so long as it is still
actively engaged in a civil investigation."'30 The court suggested that "the
a) If [appellant] has been under surveillance, state when, where, how, at
whose direction, and under what authority.
b) State whether [appellant] is currently under surveillance, at whose dis-
cretion, and under what authority.
10. State whether IRS received information from any law enforcement agency
regarding [appellant], at any time prior to the commencement of this investigation.
a) If yes, state from whom and the substance of that information.
b) State the dates on which such information was received.
I1. State whether IRS has received information from any law enforcement
agency regarding [appellant] subsequent to the commencement of this investigation.
a) If yes, state from whom and the substance of that information.
b) State the dates on which such information was received.
12. State whether the Internal Revenue Service has sought information from
any law enforcement agency regarding [appellant].
a) If yes, state to whom inquiries were made, the nature of the inquiries,
and the substance of any information received by the IRS.
b) State the date on which such inquiries were made.
13. State whether or not any information or informants have been or are being
used by the Internal Revenue Service in their investigation of [appellant].
a) If yes, state the identity of the informants.
b) State the substance of the information the informants have given you
regarding the tax liability of [appellant].
c) State the substance of any information received from informants regard-
ing any criminal tax violations by [appellant].
Id. at 851-52.
25. [T]hose imposing enforcement of a summons do bear the burden to disprove the
actual existence of a valid civil tax determination for collection purpose by the Serv-
ice . ..
Without doubt, this burden is a heavy one. Because criminal and civil fraud
liabilities are coterminous, the Service will rarely be found to have acted in bad faith
by pursuing the former.
Id. at 851-52 (quoting LaSalle, 437 U.S. at 316).
26. 661 F.2d at 850.
27. Id.
28. United States v. Southern Tanks, Inc., 619 F.2d 54, 56 (10th Cir. 1980).
29. 661 F.2d at 852.
30. Id. (emphasis in original).
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taxpayer could obtain more direct evidence whether there is an active civil
investigation simply by asking the status of the civil investigation, whether
and when an institutional posture of recommending criminal investigation
was reached, and the dates the investigation was begun and summonses were
issued."
3
In dictum, the court of appeals briefly discussed one of the defenses not
raised by the taxpayer, namely, the Service's functioning as an information-
gathering agency for other government agencies. Because Interrogatories
Ten through Thirteen inquired into the information that other government
agencies had furnished the IRS, and not whether the IRS was providing
information to other agencies, these interrogatories were also irrelevant to
the establishment of that defense.
32
Judge McKay, concurring in part and dissenting in part, argued that
the real issue was the tension between the possibility that the taxpayer would
use the discovery device as a means to delay the investigation and the possi-
bility that the Service would abuse its civil information-gathering powers to
further a criminal investigation. 33 On the possibility of delay, Judge McKay
argued that the primary means of taxpayer delay had already been checked
by confining discovery to the required summons enforcement hearing.
34
Judge McKay contended that the taxpayer's interest should be recognized
by allowing the taxpayer to present evidence of the times and frequency of
contacts between civil IRS agents and those agents who conduct criminal
investigations. Such contacts raise "an implication of entanglement of pur-
poses, ' 3 5 which requires the trial court to determine whether it should make
further inquiry.
The dissenting opinion ignores, however, that an "entanglement of pur-
poses" is perfectly legitimate under the LaSalle rule. The Supreme Court in
LaSalle recognized the "interrelated criminal/civil nature of a tax fraud in-
quiry," 36 and thus ruled that in order to block the enforcement of a sum-
mons, the taxpayer must disprove the existence of a valid civil tax
determination or collection purpose by the Service.
37
One possible defense that the court of appeals did not discuss, and to
which Interrogatory Nine 38 appears to have been relevant, was the Service's
delay in referring the case to the Justice Department for criminal investiga-
tion once the Service had made the "institutional commitment" to do so.
Delay in recommending criminal prosecution in order to gather additional
information was one of the LaSalle Court's examples of institutional bad
faith. 39 The LaSalle Court expressed concern that countenancing such a de-
lay "would permit the Government to expand its criminal discovery
31. Id.
32. Id. at 853.
33. Id. at 854 (McKay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 437 U.S. at 314.
37. Id. at 316.
38. See supra note 24.
39. 437 U.S. at 317.
19831
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rights."'40 LaSalle does not seem to suggest, however, that a court must deter-
mine whether the Service has abandoned its civil investigation. The critical
point that must be determined is the time at which there was an institutional
commitment by the IRS to make a referral. Use of its compulsory process to
gather any additional information after this point in time, regardless of a
civil purpose, is impermissible.
4 1
In the next summons enforcement case to be decided, Untted States o.
Scholbe, 4 2 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed two issues arising
under the LaSalle standards: 1) whether the Service had recommended
criminal prosecution to the Justice Department; 2) whether the Service was
acting as an information-gathering agency for the Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministration (DEA). The case contained an additional quirk in that both
parties agreed the trial court had applied an incorrect legal standard, and
the party prevailing at the trial court level asserted that the trial court had
made incorrect findings of fact.
The IRS began investigating the taxpayers in early 1978 and was noti-
fied shortly thereafter by the DEA of the Department of Justice that some of
the taxpayers were suspected of being "Class I" drug traffickers. Pursuant to
its investigation, the IRS issued over twenty summonses to third-party
recordkeepers, but the taxpayers intervened and stayed compliance with
each of the summonses.4 3 Later in 1978, the IRS agent in charge of the
investigation recommended that the case be referred to the Department of
Justice for a grand jury investigation. The Service, however, asked the Jus-
tice Department not to proceed with any summons enforcement actions un-
til the Service decided whether it would recommend criminal prosecution for
tax fraud to the Justice Department. 44 Shortly thereafter, the IRS agent
rescinded his request for a grand jury investigation, and served the summons
on a third-party recordkeeper that formed the basis for this case. After the
taxpayers once again intervened, the Service commenced the enforcement
proceeding.
Four evidentiary hearings were conducted by the trial court over the
following year, and the district court judge found that the IRS had recom-
mended to the Justice Department that the taxpayers be prosecuted for tax
fraud.45  Nonetheless, the district court granted enforcement of the sum-
40. Id.
41. Note, The Instituttinal Bad Faith Defense to the Enforcement ofIRS Summonses, 80 COLUM. L.
REV. 621, 629 (1980). See also Note, Dircovery in the IRS Summons Enforcement Proceeding: Less
Certain than Death and Taxes, 31 U. FLA. L. REV. 321, 332-33 (1979).
Congress enacted legislation in 1982 that prohibits the issuance of a summons under I.R.C.
§ 7602 or the commencement of a summons enforcement proceeding under § 7604 if a "Justice
Department referral" is in effect with respect to the taxpayer. A "Justice Department referral"
is in effect if the "Secretary" (see supra note 1) has recommended to the Attorney General a
grand jury investigation or criminal prosecution of the taxpayer, or if a request for a "return" or
"return information" (see inf/a note 53) is made by the Justice Department. Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 333(a), 96 Stat. 324, 622-23 (to be
codified at I.R.C. § 7602(c)).
42. 664 F.2d 1163 (10th Cir. 1981).





mons, because of an inadvertent error appearing in a previous Tenth Circuit
case.46 The previous case was United Slates v. MacKay, 47 in which the court of
appeals mistakenly referred to the recommendation "of" the Justice Depart-
ment, rather than recommendation "to" the Justice Department as the legal
ground for denying enforcement. 48 Since there was no recommendation
"of" the Justice Department for criminal prosecution, the trial judge ordered
the summons enforced. This was the legal error that both parties agreed the
trial court had made. In response, the Service, which had prevailed at trial,
urged that the trial court judge had also made incorrect findings of fact,
namely, that the IRS had recommended criminal prosecution to the Justice
Department.
Upon an independent review of the facts, the court of appeals agreed
with the government and concluded that the trial judge's finding was clearly
erroneous.49 The trial judge had not made specific references to evidence
from which it concluded that the IRS had recommended criminal prosecu-
tion. Nor could the court of appeals find any such evidence upon its in-
dependent review of the record.
The only evidence the court of appeals found that alluded to any such
recommendation was the testimony of an attorney in the Miami IRS District
Counsel's Office. This attorney gave hearsay evidence that he believed that
the IRS agent in charge of the investigation asked either an Assistant United
States Attorney or a Department of Justice Attorney, or both, whether a
grand jury could be used. The attorney further testified that he believed
that the Justice Department's response to the agent in charge was that it did
not want the case because there was insufficient information to warrant use
of a grand jury investigation. The agent in charge of the investigation, how-
ever, testified that he had never spoken with anyone outside the IRS.
50
The testimony given by the attorney for the Miami District Counsel's
Office might raise the spectre of bad faith on the part of the Service in delay-
ing a recommendation for criminal prosecution, after commitment to refer
has been reached, while gathering additional evidence for the prosecution.
The court of appeals correctly concluded, however, that "even if the trial
court believed that [the agent in charge of the investigation] asked the De-
partment of Justice whether a grand jury could be summoned, this inquiry
does not constitute an institutional recommendation for criminal prosecu-
tion or commitment to make that recommendation at a future date."
5
1
Thus, the LaSalle bad faith defense did not apply.
The trial court had also apparently concluded, and the court of appeals
agreed, that the IRS had agreed to provide the DEA with information the
IRS obtained during its tax investigation. Although the LaSalle "good-faith
standard will not permit the IRS to become an information-gathering
46. Id. at 1164-65.
47. 608 F.2d 830 (10th Cir. 1979).
48. Id. at 833.
49. Scholbe, 664 F.2d at 1165.




agency for other departments," 52 section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code
permits the Service, under carefully prescribed conditions, to disclose to cer-
tain individuals or groups, a taxpayer's "return" or "return information.
' 53
The court of appeals recognized a duty in Scholbe to attempt to "recon-
cile the right to disclose information under I.R.C. § 6103(i)(2) with the ad-
monition in LaSalle that the IRS may not become an 'information-gathering
agency for other departments.' 54 Examining the institutional posture of
the IRS, the court found nothing in the record suggesting that the IRS had
abandoned its civil investigation or that it intended to violate the strict
guidelines of section 6103. There was thus no reason to refuse enforcement
of the summons.55 The court specifically pointed out that information au-
thorized to be shared under section 6103 included information that the Serv-
ice might obtain by means of the summons process.
56
The third major summons enforcement case reviewed by the court of
appeals was United States v. Silvestain.5 7 Silvestain was an accountant in
whose office the taxpayer's records had been placed for convenience during a
routine audit conducted by the IRS. The agent in charge of the audit ex-
amined these books and records, and, after approximately twenty hours of
examination, concluded that there was a possibility that tax fraud was in-
volved in the case. 58 The agent then referred the case to the Criminal Inves-
tigation Division of the Service. A special agent subsequently issued a
summons to the accountant for the production of the books and records.
The taxpayer intervened pursuant to section 7609(b)(2),5 9 alleging that the
information sought to be obtained by means of the summons was already
within the possession of the IRS (a violation of the Powell good-faith stan-
dard).6° The taxpayer also alleged the special agent was effectively con-
ducting a "second examination" of the taxpayer's records, without providing
notice of the necessity for such examination, in contravention of section
52. Id. at 1168 (quoting LaSalle, 437 U.S. at 317).
53. A "return" includes "any tax or information return, declaration of estimated tax, or
claim for refund . . . including supporting schedules, attachments, or lists which are supple-
mental to, or part of, the return." I.R.C. § 6103(b)(1) (1976). "Return information" includes
"a taxpayer's identity, the nature, source, or amount of his income, payments, receipts, deduc-
tions, exemptions, credits, assets, liabilities, net worth, tax liability, tax withheld, deficiencies,
overassessments, or tax payments." Id. § 6103(b)(2)(A) (1976). Under this section, the Service
is authorized to disclose returns or return information to state tax officials, state audit agencies,
persons having a material interest, congressional committees, the President, certain federal offi-
cials for purposes of tax administration (including officials of the Department of Justice), and
certain federal officers or employees for non-tax criminal investigations. Id. § 6103(d)-(i) (1976
& Supp. IV 1980) (amended 1982).
54. 664 F.2d at 1167. The court's duty is consistent with the congressional intent behind
I.R.C. § 6103, contained in JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM AcT OF 1976 315, reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. 1, 327: "[Tihe
Congress strove to balance the particular office or agency's need for the information involved
with the citizen's right to privacy and the related impact of the disclosure upon the continuation
of compliance with our country's voluntary tax assessment system."
55. 664 F.2d at 1168.
56. Id. at 1167.
57. 668 F.2d 1161 (10th Cir. 1982).
58. Id. at 1162.
59. I.R.C. § 7609(b)(2) (1976) (amended 1982).
60. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58 (1964).
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7605(b).6 1 In defense, the taxpayer also asserted his fifth amendment privi-
lege, claiming that the accountant was merely a conduit for him and that he
still maintained possession of the records.
The court of appeals rejected the taxpayer's contention that the infor-
mation sought by means of the summons was already in the possession of the
Service because of the initial investigation. Since a tax fraud audit differs
both quantitatively and qualitatively from a routine audit, the government
could not be deemed already to possess the information sought. 62 The tax-
payer also asserted that the administrative steps required by the Code in
section 7605(b) were not followed by the Service. The court of appeals also
rejected this argument, citing authority from other circuits holding that noti-
fication to the taxpayer is not necessary where the second inspection is, as a
practical matter, merely a continuation of the original investigation. 63 Since
the revenue agent had not completed her audit at the time she referred the
case, the investigation by the special agent was merely a continuation of the
original investigation. No notification to the taxpayer was necessary, be-
cause a second examination had not begun.
The court of appeals also denied the taxpayer's fifth amendment claim
by rejecting the contention that he retained constructive possession of the
records. The United States Supreme Court established the limits of the fifth
amendment privilege in two cases in which tax records sought by the govern-
ment were in possession of third persons. In the first of these cases, Couch v.
Unied States,64 the taxpayer was the sole proprietress of a restaurant. For
several years she had given statements and records to her accountant for the
purpose of preparing her income tax returns. In holding the privilege un-
available, the Court pointed out that the fifth amendment privilege is a per-
sonal one that attaches to the individual and not to the information
sought. 65 The Court concluded that the privilege should be tied to the con-
cept of possession of the evidence rather than ownership of it. The Court did
leave open the possibility that in some situations constructive possession
might be "so clear" or the relinquishment of possession by the owner of the
record might be "so temporary and insignificant" that the fifth amendment
privilege would still be available.6 6 In Fisher o. UnitedStates,6 7 after an inves-
tigation had begun into the possibility of civil or criminal violations by the
taxpayers, the taxpayers transferred certain records from their accountants
to their attorneys. When summonses were served on the attorneys, the attor-
neys invoked a fifth amendment privilege on behalf of their clients. The
Court, relying on Couch, concluded that the Fisher situation was not a case of
61. I.R.C. § 7605(b) (1976) provides: "No taxpayer shall be subjected to unnecessary ex-
amination or investigations, and only one inspection of a taxpayer's books of account shall be
made for each taxable year unless the taxpayer requests otherwise or unless the Secretary, after
investigation, notifies the taxpayer in writing that an additional inspection is necessary."
62. 668 F.2d at 1163.
63. Id. at 1163-64.
64. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
65. Id. at 328.
66. Id. at 333.
67. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
1983]
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constructive possession or merely temporary and insignificant relinquish-
ment of possession.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted constructive possession
under Fisher and Couch to mean that "the records sought remain within the
actual physical control of the party asserting the constitutional privilege
even though they may be placed with another party for custodial safekeep-
ing."'68 In Silvestain, the accountant was not given the records merely for
custodial safekeeping. Hence, the court ruled enforcement of the summons
would not violate the taxpayer's fifth amendment privilege.
69
II. EMPLOYEE PROFIT SHARING PLANS
In Tamko Asphalt Products, Inc. v. Commissioner,7° the court of appeals re-
viewed a United States Tax Court decision upholding the Service's ruling
that Tamko's profit sharing trust did not meet the qualifications for tax ben-
efits under section 401 of the Code.
A profit sharing plan such as the one drawn up by Tamko is a type of
deferred compensation plan with tax benefits to both the employee and the
employer. In general, the amounts contributed to the trust by the employer
are deductible by the employer in the year the contributions are made, 71 as
if the compensation were paid directly to the employee in the same year.
The employee, however, pays no income tax on these contributions until he
or she receives retirement benefits from the fund. 72 Furthermore, the income
earned by a qualified trust is not taxable until it is distributed to the
employee.
73
In order to qualify for this special tax treatment, such a profit sharing
trust must meet several requirements, including minimum vesting require-
ments 74 and a requirement that contributions or benefits do not discriminate
in favor of employees who are officers, shareholders, or highly
compensated.
75
Several vesting alternatives that meet the minimum requirements are
given in section 411 of the Code, and compliance with any one of these alter-
natives automatically satisfies the antidiscrimination provisions of section
401(a) (4), unless there is reason to believe that accrual of benefits or forfeit-
ures will tend to discriminate in favor of key employees. 76 The Service has
provided further guidelines for vesting and antidiscrimination. A plan
under which an employee has a nonforfeitable (ze., vested) right to forty
percent of his or her accrued benefits derived from employer contributions
after four years of service automatically meets the nondiscrimination re-
quirements of section 401(a) (4) ('4-40 vesting'). A plan that does not qualify
68. Slvestain, 668 F.2d at 1164.
69. Id. at 1165.
70. 658 F.2d 735 (10th Cir. 1981).
71. I.R.C. § 404 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (amended 1982).
72. Id. §§ 402(a), 501(a) (West Supp. 1982) (amended 1982).
73. Id. § 401 (West Supp. 1982) (amended 1982).
74. Id. §§ 401(a)(7), 411 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
75. Id. § 
4 01(a)(4) (Supp. IV 1980).
76. Id. § 411(d)(1)(B) (1976).
[Vol. 60:2
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for the 4-40 safe harbor must meet the "key employee test" or the "turnover
test."'7 7 The "key employee test" is applicable only during the first seven
years of an employer's existence, and was therefore irrelevant to Tamko's
situation. Under the "turnover test," a plan would meet the nondiscrimina-
tion requirements of section 401(a) (4) if the turnover rate for rank and file
employees during the last five years did not exceed the greater of six percent
or the turnover rate of the prohibited group.
78
The plan submitted by Tamko called for vesting of an employee's rights
to twenty-five percent of the employer's contributions after five years of serv-
ice, and thus did not qualify for the antidiscrimination safe harbor provided
by 4-40 vesting. If an employee were terminated prior to full vesting (15
years), the unvested portion of his account would be distributed among the
remaining participants in the plan. The data submitted by Tamko showed
that the turnover rate of rank and file employees during the past five years
was sixteen percent, while the turnover rate for the prohibited group was
zero. (Only one officer was covered by the plan, and this officer had been
continuously employed by Tamko for over fifteen years).
79
Based on these facts, the Service concluded that the plan submitted by
Tamko did not qualify under section 401 of the Code. 80 This determination
was upheld by the Tax Court, and Tamko sought review by the Tenth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals. On appeal, Tamko objected to the Tax Court's inclu-
sion of the turnover rates of rank and file employees employed by Tamko's
parent corporation and another subsidiary. The court of appeals noted,
however, that the plan provided that employees who transferred between
Tamko and its parent or the other subsidiary retained their previous years of
service for vesting purposes, and that such transfers did not amount to termi-
nation. It was proper, therefore, in determining whether Tamko's plan was
qualified, to consider the turnover rate of the affiliated corporations, since
employees of the affiliated corporations could benefit from forfeitures under
the Tamko plan.8 1 Thus, the Tax Court decision was affirmed.
III. BASIS OF PARTNER'S PARTNERSHIP INTEREST
In Long v. Commssloner,8 2 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals considered
the taxpayer's calculation of the basis of an interest in a partnership formerly
held by the taxpayer's father's estate. The taxpayer's father and brother
formed a partnership to do business as the Long Construction Co., with the
taxpayer's brother owning a seventy-five percent interest and his father a
twenty-five percent interest.8 3 Upon the father's death in 1963, the partner-
ship was insolvent. Liabilities outstanding against the partnership included
77. See Rev. Proc. 76-11, 1976-1 C.B. 550; Rev. Proc. 75-49, 1975-2 C.B. 584.
78. Rev. Proc. 75-49, 1975-2 C.B. 584, 585.
79. Tamko Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Commissioner, 658 F.2d 735, 736-37 (10th Cir. 1981).
80. Id. at 738.
81. Id. at 740-41.
82. 660 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1981).
83. Id. at 417. The taxpayer had been a partner for six years, but he withdrew from the
partnership in 1958. Long v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 1, 2 (1978), supplemental opinion, 71 T.C.
724 (1979), modi fied, 660 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1981).
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two contingent liabilities in the form of lawsuits and two debts owed to sepa-
rate banks in the area. The lawsuits were later settled, the estate paying the
entire amount of the settlement, including attorneys' fees. The estate also
paid the entire amount due on the notes executed in favor of the banks.84
The father had died testate, leaving his wife, the taxpayer, and the tax-
payer's brother each one-third of his estate. In addition, the estate succeeded
to the decedent's interest in the partnership.85
Although the estate paid these claims, the administrator sought and ob-
tained an order of the probate court that the taxpayer's brother was liable as
a general partner for seventy-five percent of all partnership liabilities. Since
the brother had no assets with which to satisfy these liabilities, the probate
court offset this debt against the brother's distributive share of the estate,
thus leaving nothing for the brother under the will. 86 Six years later the
partnership was liquidated, and the estate, in calculating its basis in its part-
nership interest, included the entire amount of the obligations previously
paid by the estate. It thus ended up with a long-term capital loss from the
partnership liquidation, which it was unable to use. The taxpayer, acting
pursuant to section 642(h) of the Code, then claimed his share (now fifty
percent, due to the probate court order) of the capital loss as a beneficiary of
the estate. The IRS disallowed the loss claimed by the taxpayer, asserting
that the estate had miscalculated its basis in its partnership interest.
Section 1014 of the Code provides that the basis of a partnership inter-
est acquired from a decedent is equal to the fair market value of the interest
at death.8 7 This basis is increased by the estate's share of partnership liabili-
ties8 8 and by its distributive share of partnership income. 89 This basis is
then decreased by the estate's share of partnership losses.9° Finally, any lia-
bilities assumed by the estate that result in an increase in the estate's share of
partnership liabilities or in the estate's individual liabilities are treated as a
contribution of money by the estate to the partnership. 91 In the instant case,
all parties agreed that the fair market value of the partnership interest at the
date of the father's death was zero; the adjustments due to the estate's dis-
tributive share of partnership income and losses were also not disputed. The
dispute was over the estate's increase in its basis of 100% of the liabilities
paid by the estate, even though the probate court had determined that the
taxpayer's brother was liable to the estate for seventy-five percent of these
payments.
The Tax Court agreed with the Commissioner, holding that the estate
could increase the basis in its partnership interest only by an amount equal
to twenty-five percent of the payment actually made by the estate.92 The
84. 71 T.C. at 2, 3.
85. 660 F.2d at 417, 418.
86. Id. at 418.
87. I.R.C. § 1014(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
88. Treas. Reg. § 1.742-1 (1956).
89. I.R.C. § 705(a)(I) (1976).
90. Id. § 705(a)(2).
91. Id. § 752(a).
92. 71 T.C. at 10.
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Tax Court stated that the record was unclear as to the amount that the
estate was able to obtain from the taxpayer's brother and simply concluded
that "the estate did receive [the brother's] full contribution. '93 Under sec-
tion 752, the Tax Court thus increased the estate's basis by twenty-five per-
cent of the partnership liabilities, the share actually assumed individually by
the estate. 94 With an increase in basis equal only to twenty-five percent,
instead of 100% of the partnership liabilities, the Tax Court concluded that
there was a net capital gain to the estate upon liquidation of the partnership.
The taxpayer, therefore, could not claim a capital loss under section 642(h).
The court of appeals agreed with the Tax Court's analysis, except for
the Tax Court's conclusion that the record was unclear as to how much the
estate was able to collect from the brother. 95 The appellate court, relying on
state law, noted that when a distributee is indebted to the estate, the admin-
istrator may offset the debt against any property to which such indebted
distributee is entitled.96 The court further noted that was exactly what was
done by the probate court in this case. After the offset nothing was left for
the brother, and the probate court ordered the administrator to distribute
the entire residue of the estate equally between the taxpayer and the father's
wife.9 7 From these facts, the court of appeals concluded that the estate had
collected from the indebted son an amount exactly equal to his distributive
share, namely, one-third of the net estate.98 Thus, while the estate could
increase its basis in the partnership by the entire amount of the brother's
partnership liabilities assumed by the estate, the basis, in turn, had to be
reduced by the amount deemed collected from the brother. These calcula-
tions gave the estate a net long term capital loss, and the case was remanded
to the Tax Court for proceedings consistent with the calculations.
IV. SECTION 337 LIQUIDATIONS
Congress enacted section 337 to allow corporations (primarily closely
held corporations) to liquidate all of their assets tax free, without having to
worry about the trap laid by the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Court Hold-
ing Co. ,99 and United States v. Cumberland Pub/c Servze Co. 100 In Court Holding
Co., negotiations for the sale of an apartment building took place between
the corporate owner of the building and the prospective purchaser. After an
oral agreement was reached and the prospective purchasers had paid $1,000
to the corporation, the parties met to reduce the agreement to writing. The
corporation's tax attorney halted the transactions when he realized that the
sale would result in a large tax liability to the corporation. It would have
been far more advantageous for the corporation's shareholders (husband and
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. 660 F.2d at 418.
96. See, e.g., Thompson v. McCune, 333 Mo. 758, 63 S.W.2d 41 (1933); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 473.630 (1978).
97. 660 F.2d at 418.
98. Id. at 420.
99. 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
100. 338 U.S. 451 (1950). For discussion of the history of§ 337, see Central Tablet Mfg. Co.
v. United States, 417 U.S. 673, 677-83 (1974).
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wife) first to liquidate the corporation's assets, which consisted only of the
apartment building, by having the corporation deed the building to the hus-
band and wife in exchange for the surrender of their shares, and then to have
the husband and wife sell the property to the purchasers.' 0°
This is precisely what was done; however, the Tax Court concluded that
despite these formalities the corporation had not abandoned the sales negoti-
ations. Thus, the gain from the sale was attributed to the corporation. The
Supreme Court agreed, holding that "[a] sale by one person cannot be trans-
formed for tax purposes into a sale by another by using the latter as a con-
duit through which to pass title.
'10 2
Five years later, in Cumberland Public Service Co., the Supreme Court up-
held this procedure as a means to avoid corporate tax on the sale, dist-
inguishing Court Holding Co. on its facts. Since the sale in Cumberland was
negotiated by the stockholders rather than by the corporation, the share-
holders were not deemed to be a mere conduit for a sale by the
corporation. '
03
Section 337, the "anti-Court Holding Co. provision," was enacted to per-
mit the liquidation and sale by a corporation of its assets without the neces-
sity for Cumberland-type machinations undertaken in the hope that courts
would continue to exalt the form over the substance. Section 337(a) pro-
vides that if a corporation adopts a plan of complete liquidation and distrib-
utes all of its assets (less those retained to meet claims) in a complete
liquidation within twelve months after the adoption of such plan, the corpo-
ration shall not recognize gain or loss from the sale or exchange of property
within the twelve-month period. The tax consequences to the shareholders
will be identical whether the corporation sells the assets and then distributes
the proceeds in liquidation, or distributes the assets in kind to the sharehold-
ers who then sell the assets. The term "property" is not defined for purposes
of subsection (a); however, subsection 337(b)(1) excludes from the definition
of "property" the following: (A) stock in trade and inventory;
(B) installment obligations acquired in the sale of stock in trade or inventory;
and (C) installment obligations acquired in respect of property, other than
stock in trade or inventory, sold or exchanged before the date of adoption of
the plan of liquidation.'° 4 Notwithstanding these exclusions, these items are
included within the definition of "property" if "substantially all" of such
property is sold or exchanged to one person in one transaction.' 0 5
In Bear v. Commissioner,10 6 the court of appeals was faced with deciding
whether the corporation had sold or exchanged substantially all of its prop-
erty to one person in one transaction. In 1972, the corporation, Brookridge
Development Company, Inc., adopted a plan of liquidation pursuant to
which it entered into an agreement with Pacesetter Homes Co. The agree-
101. Court Holding Co. v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 531, 532-36 (1943), rev'd, 143 F.2d 823 (5th
Cir. 1944), rev'd, 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
102. 324 U.S. at 334.
103. 338 U.S. at 455.
104. I.R.C. § 337(b)(1) (1976)
105. Id. § 337(b)(2).
106. 650 F.2d 1167 (10th Cir. 1981).
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ment called for Pacesetter to purchase from Brookridge thirty-eight real es-
tate lots, the entire inventory of Brookridge's property. The contract recited
a single price for the purchase of all thirty-eight lots, but it also contained a
schedule of payment for the lots. 107 Deeds were to be delivered at the time
of payment in full for each lot, and Pacesetter was entitled to select lots
individually as it progressed through its development project. Pacesetter was
not required to pay interest on the purchase price. The final lots were not
conveyed until nearly two years after the adoption of the plan of
liquidation. 108
The court of appeals agreed with the Tax Court that the contract did
not call for a completed sale within the meaning of section 337.'09 As to
when a sale is completed, the court ruled that this question is essentially one
of fact. Among factors to be considered are the transfer of legal title and the
shift in the benefits and burdens of the property.1 10 In Bear the transfer of
legal title, the proration of taxes, and the shift in benefits and burdens with
respect to each lot occurred upon payment for that lot." ' The court held
these sales could not qualify as a disposition in one transaction to one pur-
chaser completed within twelve months of the adoption of the plan of liqui-
dation; consequently, the nonrecognition provisions of section 337 were
unavailable. 12
In another section 337 case, Libery National Bank and Trust Co. v. Commzs-
sioner, '' the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals dealt with the installment obli-
gation provision of section 337(b)(1)(B). In this case the corporation, as part
of its liquidation scheme, had sold its accounts receivable for $50,000 less
than their book value. The corporation claimed that the loss was recogniza-
ble, arguing that accounts receivable are a type of installment obligation
under section 337(b)(l)(B) and are thus specifically excluded from the non-
recognition provisions of the statute. The government, on the other hand,
claimed that the definition of "installment obligation" should be limited to
the terms in section 453 of the Code.' 14
The court agreed with the taxpayer, ruling that section 453 merely pro-
vides a means by which a taxpayer who regularly sells or disposes of property
on an installment basis may report the income from such sales.'-,) Judge
McWilliams, writing for the majority, found authority in Coast Coll Co. V.
Commissioner 116 and Famiy Record Plan, Inc. v. Commissioner. 117 In Coast Coil,
the Tax Court adopted the view, and the Ninth Circuit agreed, that the
term "installment obligations" under section 337(b)(1)(B) is broader than
107. Id. at 1169.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1170.
Ill. Id.
112. M.
113. 650 F.2d 1174 (10th Cir. 1981).
114. Id. at 1176-77.
115. Id. at 1177 n.4.
116. 50 T.C. 528 (1968), a.fd, 422 F.2d 402 (9th Cir. 1970).




that envisioned by section 453. In Family Record Plan the accounts receivable
were sold at a gain. The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's position that
the gain was taxable on the ground that the accounts receivable were install-
ment obligations.
V. CAPITAL VERSUS ORDINARY LOSS-COMMODITY FUTURES
TRANSACTIONS
In Oringderjfv. Commissioner," 9 the court of appeals reviewed the Tax
Court's upholding of a deficiency assessment in connection with a taxpayer's
losses incurred in the cattle feeding business. The taxpayer had treated
losses arising from transactions in cattle futures as ordinary losses; however,
the Commission successfully argued that the losses should be treated as capi-
tal losses.
Section 1221 of the Code contains a broad general definition of "capital
assets" and a few explicit exceptions from the defintion.' 2 0 The rule for
treatment of gains and losses arising from transactions in commodity futures
was established in Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissi'oner,' 2 ' wherein the
taxpayer was a manufacturer of products made from corn. In order to avoid
having to pay increased prices for corn brought on by shortages, the com-
pany began purchasing corn futures at harvest time when the price appeared
favorable. ' 22 If no shortages were likely, it would take delivery on contracts
only as required to supply its manufacturing process and would sell the re-
mainder. If, on the other hand, shortages in the corn supply arose, the com-
pany would sell futures covering only the amount of corn that it was able to
purchase on the spot market. The company treated the profits and losses
arising from transactions in the futures as capital in nature, arguing that its
futures trading was a separate business from its manufacturing operation
and that it was acting as a "legitimate capitalist."'' 2 3 The Tax Court found,
however, that the transactions constituted an integral part of its manufactur-
ing business,' 24 and that the profits and losses were thus ordinary in nature.
The Supreme Court refused to overturn these findings of fact, noting instead
that "it appears that the transactions were vitally important to the com-
pany's business as a form of insurance against increases in the price of raw
corn."1
25
In Or'ngderff, the Tax Court found that many of the futures transactions
were opened and closed on the same day, a clear indication of a substantial
investment or speculative motive.' 26 Furthermore, although the period for
118. Family Record Plan, 36 T.C. at 310-11. In Liberty Nat'l Bank the Service urged the court
of appeals to adopt the opinion of Judge Ely, dissenting in Coast Coil. The court rejected this
invitation. 650 F.2d at 1177 n.5.
119. No. 79-1703 (10th Cir. Aug. 10, 1981).
120. Excluded are inventory-type property, depreciable property, and certain types of intel-
lectual property.
121. 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
122. Id. at 48.
123. Id. at 49.
124. Id. at 50.
125. Id.
126. No. 79-1703, slip op. at 2.
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fattening cattle is between 120 and 150 days, the majority of the contracts
were closed within ten days. From this, as well as the lack of correlation
between the taxpayer's cattle purchases and sales and his futures transac-
tions, the Tax Court found that the futures transactions were not "true hedg-
es."1 27 The court of appeals upheld the Tax Court's factual finding that the
futures transactions were primarily speculative in nature, and not an integral
part of the taxpayer's cattle business.' 28 Thus, the gains and losses should
have been treated as capital rather than ordinary.
VI. DISMISSAL UNDER TAX COURT RULE 123(B)
In Drury v. Commissioner 129 the taxpayer appealed the Tax Court's order
of dismissal under Rule 123(b) of the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Pro-
cedure for failure to prosecute his petition for review of deficiencies. Rule
123(b) provides that the Tax Court may dismiss a case and enter a decision
against the petitioner for failure to prosecute properly his or her petition.
Such a decision "shall operate as an adjudication on the merits."' 30 The
taxpayer's appeal of the 123(b) dismissal was based on his contention that
the Tax Court had no jurisdiction over his case and was therefore without
power to dismiss. The taxpayer claimed that the Tax Court was divested of
jurisdiction because of his offer to withdraw his petition from the Tax Court.
The Tax Court had treated this offer as a motion to withdraw, and had
denied the motion. Apparently the taxpayer desired to commence an action
for refund in federal district court.
The court of appeals viewed the taxpayer's jurisdictional argument as
an attempt to circumvent the effects of section 6512(a),1 3 ' which provides for
an election of remedies by a taxpayer who has been served with a notice of
deficiency. Under section 6512(a), once a petition for review of deficiencies
is filed with the Tax Court, no suit may be filed by the taxpayer for the
recovery of any part of the tax except as to overpayments determined by the
Tax Court, amounts collected in excess of tax liability computed by the Tax
Court, and amounts collected after the period of limitation has expired. '
3 2
The taxpayer in Drury fell into none of these exceptions. Thus, once he filed
his petition, he was unable to withdraw the petition and file suit in district
court. According to the court of appeals, the Tax Court was never divested
of jurisdiction. Given that more than two years had elapsed between the
notice of deficiency and the taxpayer's motion to withdraw, the court of ap-
peals believed the Tax Court justifably saw the attempted withdrawal as a
dilatory tactic. The Tax Court was therefore warranted in granting the
Commissioner's Rule 123(b) motion to dismiss the case on the merits for
127. Id. at 3.
128. Id. at 3.
129. No. 81-1670 (10th Cir. Feb. I, 1982).
130. T.C. R. PRAC. AND P. 123(d). Rule 123(b) is thus similar to FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
131. No. 81-1670, slip op. at 4. See I.R.C. § 6512(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (amended
1982).
132. A fourth exception, overpayments attributable to partnership items, was added by the
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 402(c)(8), 96 Stat. 324,
668 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 6512(a)(4)).
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failure to prosecute. 133
VII. DETERMINATION OF INCOME
Injosin v. United States, 134 the taxpayer was assessed a deficiency based
on his method of valuing income under section 61(a)(1). The taxpayer was
an attorney who provided legal services to his clients in exchange for pay-
ment in silver dollars. 1 35 The attorney's normal billing rate was, by his own
characterization, fifty "one-dollar" Federal Reserve notes per hour. 136 In
the situation under review, the attorney rendered twenty hours of legal serv-
ices to his client and received 200 silver dollars as his fee. Although he could
have billed the client for 1,000 "one-dollar" Federal Reserve notes rather
than the 200 silver dollars, he reported only $200 as income from this trans-
action on his return.
The district court dismissed the attorney's suit to recover the deficiency
assessment. 137 The court of appeals affirmed, essentially characterizing the
silver dollars as "property" other than cash. 138 Under the Treasury Regula-
tions, 139 such property is measured at its fair market value for income pur-
poses. The taxpayer in effect had admitted that the silver dollars had a
market value of five times their face value. The court ruled it inconsequen-
tial that silver dollars have a face value of one dollar and can be exchanged
for a one dollar Federal Reserve note, pointing out that Congress has pro-
vided a means by which the Treasury Department can sell silver dollars at
their fair market value, rather than at their face value.
140
VIII. AVAILABILITY OF DEDUCTIONS
The court of appeals reviewed three cases in which deductions taken by
the taxpayer were disallowed by the Commission. In Pilcher v. Commis-
sioner,'4 1 the taxpayer was employed as a pipefitter at a construction site
located sixty-seven miles from his residence. There were no living quarters
available at the construction site, and the taxpayer could find none closer
than his place of residence. The taxpayer worked at the construction site for
several months in 1970 or 1971, and again from late 1973 until early 1978.
The taxpayer deducted the costs of commuting to and from the job site on
his 1974 and 1975 income tax returns. These deductions were disallowed by
133. No. 81-1670, slip op. at 4-5.
134. 666 F.2d 1306 (10th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1306-07.
137. The same argument was rejected by the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Ware, 608
F.2d 400 (10th Cir. 1979), a case in which Mr. Joslin represented the taxpayer. In that case, Mr.
Joslin "stated that his concern was not with the defendant, his client. Such as it was, his con-
cern was with obtaining a ruling which would nullify the use of Treasury notes as legal tender
and which would compel such obligations to be paid in gold coin." Id. at 402.
138. 666 F.2d at 1307.
139. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(1), T.D. 7554, 1978-2 C.B. 71, 73.
140. See Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, P.L. 91-607, § 205, 84 Stat.
1760, 1769 (authorizing sale by Secretary of the Treasury of approximately three million silver
dollars).
141. 651 F.2d 717 (10th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
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the Commission, and the Tax Court upheld the disallowance. 1
42
Section 162(a)(2) allows as a deduction "all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade
or business, including. . . traveling expenses. . . while away from home in
the pursuit of a trade or business." On the other hand, no deduction is al-
lowed for personal, living, or family expenses.14 3 In determining whether a
deduction is available under section 162(a)(2), a key question that must be
answered is whether the taxpayer is "away from home."' 144 The Commis-
sioner has ruled that a taxpayer's "home," for purposes of section 162(a)(2),
is his regular or principal place of business or employment. 145 This concept
of a section 162 "tax home" is not universally accepted by the courts, as the
Second Circuit rejects this definition. 146 The next obstacle the taxpayer con-
fronts is establishing that the assignment is only "temporary" in nature. The
Tax Court has recognized a distinction between employment that is tempo-
rary and that which is merely indefinite.'
4 7
When the taxpayer in Pi/cher resumed working in 1973 it was antici-
pated that construction on the project would continue for several additional
years. Given this record, the Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals concluded
there was ample evidence to support the Tax Court's decision that the tax-
payer's employment at the construction site was not temporary. Thus, the
court affirmed the disallowance.
The court considered another case involving a deduction under section
162(a), this one supported by a claim that the deduction could also be made
under section 212.148 In Snyder v. United States 149 the taxpayer was a practic-
ing attorney who began work on a book of photographs of Colorado in 1972.
Pursuant to his expectation and goal of publishing the book, the taxpayer
acquired sophisticated photographic equipment and devoted approximately
thirty hours a week to the effort. The number of rolls of film that the tax-
payer exposed increased dramatically from 1971 to 1972, and the taxpayer
began to keep detailed records of technical data regarding his photographs.
After corresponding with several publishers to promote interest in his book,
the taxpayer traveled to New York and San Francisco to meet with some of
them. Although almost all of the taxpayer's income was derived from prac-
ticing law, he claimed deductions for his photographic efforts on his 1972
and 1973 income tax returns. The IRS determined that the deductions were
not allowable under either section 162 or section 212 and assessed the tax-
payer accordingly. The taxpayer paid the amount assessed, filed a claim for
142. Id. at 718.
143. I.R.C. § 262 (1976).
144. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 470 (1946).
145. See Rev. Rul. 71-247, 1971-1 C.B. 54; Rev. Rul. 60-189, 1960-1 C.B. 60.
146. See, e.g., Six v. United States, 450 F.2d 66 (2d Cir. 1971); Rosenspan v. United States,
438 F.2d 905 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971).
147. See, e.g., McCallister v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 508 (1978); Blatnick v. Commissioner,
56 T.C. 1344 (1971); cf. Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465 (1946). But see Harvey v. Com-
missioner, 283 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1960) (rejecting the "temporary-indefinite" distinction).
148. I.R.C. § 212(a) (1976) allows a deduction of "all the ordinary and necessary expenses
paid or incurred during the taxable year for the production or collection of income."
149. 674 F.2d 1359 (10th Cir. 1982).
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a refund, and instituted a suit to recover the assessments.' 50
The trial judge, in what he termed to be "rough" oral findings of fact
and conclusions of law from the bench, found that the taxpayer had "sincere
hopes" of selling his photography book and that he "does hope to make a
profit."'' 5  Nonetheless, the judge concluded that the taxpayer was not en-
gaged in the "trade or business" of publishing a book, and upheld the Com-
mission's disallowance of the deductions under both sections 162 and 212.
The term "trade or business" is not defined in the Code, nor has a defin-
itive answer appeared in the case law. The Supreme Court has stated that
the determination whether the activities of a taxpayer amount to "carrying
on a business" requires an examination of the facts in each case. 152 As the
court of appeals in Snyder pointed out, lower courts have seized upon the
profit motive as a major test in determining whether a taxpayer is engaged
in a trade or business.' 5 3 It is this element that generally distinguishes a
trade or business from a mere hobby. Expenses incurred in the pursuit of
hobbies are clearly not deductible under either section. 154 Relying on a
Third Circuit case,t 55 the court admonished the trial court on remand to sift
through the facts carefully to determine whether the taxpayer was "primar-
ily motivated .. .by his love of photography as a hobby or by a good faith
expectation of making a profit."' 56 Even if the taxpayer were primarily mo-
tivated by profit, he was also required to show that the activities were "ex-
tensive" and were carried on over a "substantial" period of time.
157
The court directed that if the trial court were to find that the taxpayer
was not engaged in a trade or business, it must then examine whether under
section 212 the expenses were deductible as "ordinary and necessary. . . for
the production or collection of income." As the court noted, sections 162
and 212 are to be read together, and in order to be deductible under section
212, the expense "must satisfy the same requirements that apply to a trade
or business expense under section 162 except that the person claiming the
deduction need not be in the trade or business."' 58 The case was remanded
for further factual findings and legal reasoning.
In Kilgroe v. United States, 159 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals consid-
ered depreciation deductions taken under section 167 of the Code.' 60 The
taxpayer in this case was the transferee of KIP Corporation, and as such was
responsible for the prior tax liabilities of the corporation. In 1969, KIP Cor-
poration had constructed some prefabricated buildings that were then leased
150. Id. at 1361-62.
151. Id. at 1362.
152. Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212, 217 (1941).
153. 674 F.2d at 1362.
154. See, e.g., American Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 262 F.2d 150 (9th Cir. 1958);
Wrightsman v. United States, 428 F.2d 1316 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
155. Imbesi v. Commissioner, 361 F.2d 640 (3d Cir. 1966).
156. Snyder, 674 F.2d at 1364.
157. Id.
158. Id. (quoting Fischer v. United States, 450 F.2d 218, 222 (7th Cir. 1973)).
159. 664 F.2d 1168 (10th Cir. 1981).
160. I.R.C. § 167(a) (1976) allows "as a depreciation deduction a reasonable allowance for
the exhaustion, wear and tear (including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence) of property
used in the trade or business, or of property held for the production of income."
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to a community college for three years. For the years 1970 through 1974 the
corporation took deductions under section 167 based on a three-year useful
life of the buildings. The result of this rapid depreciation was that loss de-
ductions were carried over into the taxpayer's 1973 tax return. The Service
disallowed these deductions, claiming that the buildings had either a useful
life of forty years, with no salvage value, or three years with a salvage value
of $389,375. The buildings originally cost $578,030 to construct.
16 1
The district court found that the buildings had a useful life of ten years
with no salvage value, a finding that was not disputed by either party on
appeal. The dispute was over the method of calculating the allowable de-
preciation for the remaining seven years of the buildings' useful lives. The
taxpayer maintained that the deductions taken by KIP in the first three
years were not allowed by the Internal Revenue Service and thus could not
be counted when figuring the depreciation for the following years. The
Service maintained that the depreciation for the first three years had not
been challenged, and therefore was allowed under section 167. As a result,
the government argued, the adjusted basis, for calculating the remaining de-
preciation, was the difference between the original basis and the amount
already deducted (to the extent such deductions produced a tax benefit) dur-
ing the first three years of the buildings' lives. The district court ruled for
the taxpayer on this issue, and ordered a refund. On appeal, the government
claimed that the district court had made an error in arriving at the amount
of refund due the taxpayer, and the taxpayer apparently conceded that the
government's position was correct. 1
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The court of appeals reversed the trial court's holdings, stating that the
deductions taken during the first three years of the buildings' lives had not
been challenged and were, therefore, "allowed" under section 167. The
court noted that the district court's result, reducing the basis by only the
amount that should have been deducted during the first three years, rather
than by the amount actually taken, would violate the well-established rule
that a taxpayer's total claimed depreciation deduction could not exceed the
cost of the asset minus its salvage value.1
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IX. CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS
In two noteworthy cases, the court of appeals reviewed criminal convic-
tions, upholding both. In United States v. Erickson,' 6 4 the taxpayers, husband
and wife, owned and operated a tax service in Oklahoma. In addition to
being charged with willfully aiding and abetting in the preparation of false
income tax returns of their clients, the taxpayers were charged with willfully
failing to file their income tax returns for three years. On appeal, the de-
fendants contended that the affidavit supporting the issuance of a search
warrant was insufficient due to the staleness of its contents. The court of
appeals rejected this argument, noting that some of the incriminating infor-
161. 664 F.2d at 1169.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1170.
164. 676 F.2d 408 (10th Cir.) cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 118 (1982).
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mation had been supplied by a current employee of the tax service.' 65 Fur-
thermore, the affidavit indicated that the violations were ongoing.
One of the other defenses, advanced by the husband, was that he lacked
the ability to form a specific intent to commit the crime with which he was
charged. An expert defense witness testified that the husband had "over the
years developed a 'delusion' about the tax laws to the end that although
Erickson could control his conduct, he nonetheless did not believe that he
was doing anything wrong by disobeying the tax laws."' 16" The trial judge
accordingly instructed the jury that evidence concerning the husband's
mental state could be considered only for the purpose of determining
whether he had the requisite specific intent to violate the tax laws. The
taxpayer apparently had wanted an instruction on the insanity defense, an
instruction the trial court did not give. The court of appeals upheld the
instruction given, since the expert testimony addressed merely the inability
to form a specific intent.
167
The trial court had also excluded evidence that the taxpayers in good
faith believed that the tax laws were unconstitutional. Citing United States v.
Dillon,'168 the court of appeals rejected this defense. An evil motive or bad
purpose is not required to establish the offense. 1
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United States v. Lawson 170 was a tax protester case in which the defendant
had filed blank income tax returns for 1978 and 1979, and had claimed
ninety-nine exemptions on the withholding certificate he gave to his em-
ployer in 1979, thus claiming total exemption from withholding. On appeal,
the court found most of Lawson's contentions specious.
Lawson claimed that the trial court erred in denying his pretrial mo-
tions to dismiss because his wages were not income within the meaning of the
Internal Revenue Code and the Constitution. Lawson also claimed error in
the trial court's refusal to hold his trial in Casper, Wyoming, rather than in
Cheyenne, its refusal to exclude federal government employees from the jury
panel, and its refusal to allow Lawson to inspect and copy jury selection
records.'7' The court of appeals rejected the first three claims, but re-
manded the case to allow Lawson's counsel to inspect the jury selection
records pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1867(f).172 The court ruled that reversal of
the conviction was not called for at that time; however, if, upon inspection of
the jury selection records Lawson could prove an improper method of select-
ing the jury, the conviction would be set aside at that point.
1 73
Lawson also asserted the trial court erred in denying his motions for
acquittal at the end of the government's case and at the close of all evidence.
165. Id. at 410.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. 566 F.2d 702 (10th Cir. 1977), cerl. denied, 435 U.S. 971 (1978).
169. 676 F.2d at 411.
170. 670 F.2d 923 (10th Cir. 1982).
171. Id. at 925.
172. 28 U.S.C. § 1867(o (1976) permits a party, in preparing a motion to dismiss for failure
to comply with the statutory jury selection provisions, to inspect and copy records used by the
jury commission or clerk in connection with the selection process.
173. 670 F.2d at 926.
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These motions were based upon the failure of the government to establish
jurisdiction, and his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Lawson also contended the government failed to prove willfulness in not
filing returns and in claiming ninety-nine exemptions on the withholding
certificate, or specific intent to deceive his employer upon claiming the
ninety-nine exemptions. Lawson further claimed that the jury's verdict was
against the weight of the evidence and thus could not stand. He also ap-
pealed his sentence and the probation conditions imposed by the trial judge.
The court of appeals rejected all of Lawson's contentions.
t 74
The sentencing and probation conditions imposed by the trial judge did
raise some noteworthy points. As a condition of his probation, the trial court
required that Lawson "disassociate himself with any organization that has
[as] its purpose defeating the Internal Revenue Service laws, including an
organization known as the Wyoming Patriots and shall not encourage other
individuals to disobey the laws of the United States."'175 Lawson's appeal
was based on the first amendment right of association. The court of appeals
construed the condition so as to prohibit association only with groups that
advocated violation of the tax laws and thus upheld the condition of
probation. 1
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The court relied on two other tax protester cases, United States v. Smith '77
and Porth v. Templar. 178 In Smith, a condition of parole that the parolee "di-
vorce [himself] from any organization advocating the willful disobediance of
any local, state or federal law and. . . refrain from making any statement to
others advocating any disobedience of any local, state or federal law," 179 was
modified by the court of appeals. The court struck the phrase "any local,
state, or federal law" as too broad a restriction that was not reasonably re-
lated to the rehabilitation of the parolee. The court substituted the phrase
"the Internal Revenue Code."' 80 Similarly, in Porth, the probationer was
prohibited from circulating materials questioning the constitutionality of the
Federal Reserve System and the Federal Income Tax Law, from speaking or
writing activities questioning the constitutionality of the same, and from
leaving the jurisdiction of the court without prior written authorization.
The court of appeals in Porth held that the conditions were invalid to the
extent that they prohibited the expression of opinions as to invalidity or un-
174. Id. at 927-30.
175. Id. at 929.
176. Id. at 930. Trial courts have broad discretion in sentencing matters, including prescrib-
ing conditions of probation. See, e.g., Malone v. United States, 502 F.2d 554 (9th Cir. 1974)
(defendant convicted of unlawful exportation of firearms from the United States to the United
Kingdom; conditions of probation included that he not participate in any American Irish Re-
publican movement; that he belong to no Irish organizations, cultural or otherwise; that he not
belong to or participate in any Irish Catholic organizations or groups; that he not visit any Irish
pubs; and that he accept no employment that directly or indirectly associated him with any
Irish organization or movement); United States v. Kohlberg, 472 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1973)
(defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of mailing obscene matter; condition of probation in-
cluded that he not associate with any known homosexuals).
177. 618 F.2d 280 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 868 (1980).
178. 453 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1971).




constitutionality of the laws in question but were valid so far as they prohib-
ited urging or encouraging others to violate the laws. 181
The trial court had also sentenced Lawson to four months in prison for
failing to file the 1978 return, assessed him the costs of prosecuting the case
for failing to file the 1979 return, and fined him $2,000 for falsely filling out
the withholding certificate. Sometime afterwards, but before Lawson had
paid the fine or begun serving his sentence, the trial court realized that the
fine for filing a false withholding certificate could not exceed $500. 182 The
judge then modified the sentence by eliminating the fine for filing the false
certificate but imposing a $2,000 fine for failing to file the 1979 return. On
appeal, Lawson asserted that the judge could not increase his sentence once
it had been imposed. The court of appeals, relying on United States V.
DiTFrancesco 183 also rejected this assertion. 184
Jeff ey, Bartholomew
181. 453 F.2d at 334.
182. 670 F.2d at 929. Set I.R.C. § 7205 (West Supp. 1982) (amended 1982) (fine was in-
creased to $1,000 maximum for tax years beginning after Dec. 31, 1981).
183. 449 U.S. 117 (1980).
184. 670 F.2d at 929.
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